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Abstract
We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the
points in the unit interval. The acceptance or rejection of a proposal is determined
by an acceptance rule represented by the collection of decisive coalitions. The focus
of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary
strategies as the players become inﬁnitely patient. We show that, along any sequence
of stationary subgame perfect equilibria the social acceptance set collapses to a point.
This point, called the limit of bargaining equilibria, is independent of the sequence
of equilibria and is uniquely determined by the set of players, the utility functions,
the recognition probabilities, and the acceptance rule. The central result of the
paper is a characterization of the limit of bargaining equilibria as a unique zero of
the characteristic equation. The characterization is used to study the comparative
statics of the limit of bargaining equilibria with respect to the acceptance rule.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes a model of multilateral bargaining where players must choose one
alternative from a set of alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. An alter-
native might be a level of taxation, a location of a facility, or an index of an ideological
content of a policy (left vs. right).
Bargaining proceeds as follows. At the beginning of each period, nature randomly
selects one of the players as a proposer. The probability for a player to become a proposer,
the so–called recognition probability, is assumed to be the same in each period. The player
chosen by nature puts forward a proposal specifying one alternative. All players then react
to the proposal. Each player can either reject or accept the proposal. Whether the proposal
passes or fails is then determined by the acceptance rule, as represented by the collection
of decisive coalitions. The passing of a proposal requires an approval of it by all the players
in some decisive coalition. Examples of acceptance rules are the unanimity acceptance rule
when a passing of a proposal requires an approval of it by all the players, and the quota
rule, when a ﬁxed number of votes is needed for a passing of a proposal. If the proposal
passes, it is implemented and the game ends. In this case each player receives a discounted
utility of the implemented alternative. Otherwise, a new period begins.
We consider subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Stationarity means that
a proposal of any player does not depend on the history of play and a player’s reaction to a
proposal depends only on the proposal itself. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic
behavior of stationary subgame perfect equilibria as the discount factor approaches one.
We prove that subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies are asymptotically
unique in the following sense: Along any sequence of subgame perfect equilibria in sta-
tionary strategies the social acceptance set collapses to a point. This point, called the
limit of bargaining equilibria, is independent of the sequence of equilibria and is uniquely
determined by the set of players, the utility functions, the recognition probabilities, and
the acceptance rule. The central result of the paper is a characterization of the the limit
of bargaining equilibria as a unique zero of the characteristic equation.
The results are obtained under rather minimal assumptions. Thus the instantaneous
utility functions are only assumed to be single–peaked and concave. Furthermore, we
require that the intersection of any two decisive coalitions contain a player with a positive
recognition probability. This requirement puts but a very mild restriction on the acceptance
rule and the recognition probabilities.
Various results on one–dimensional bargaining have been previously obtained in Banks
and Duggan [1], Cho and Duggan [5], Kalandrakis [12], Cardona and Ponsati [4], Herings
and Predtetchinski [11], Imai and Salonen [9], Compte and Jehiel [6]. Banks and Duggan
[1] consider bargaining in a situation where the alternatives are represented by points in
a general compact convex set. For the special case where the set of alternatives is one–
dimensional they establish the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in pure
strategies.
The question of uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in the one–dimensional
bargaining game is addressed in Cho and Duggan [5], Cardona and Ponsati [4], Herings and
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Predtetchinski [11]. Cho and Duggan [5] derive the uniqueness of subgame perfect equilib-
ria in pure stationary strategies assuming that the utility functions are quadratic and the
acceptance rule is proper and strong. Cardona and Ponsati [4] show that stationary sub-
game perfect equilibria in pure strategies are unique in a game where the proposers rotate
in a ﬁxed sequence, provided that each player’s utility function is symmetric around the
peak and the acceptance rule is a quota rule. Herings and Predtetchinski [11] establish the
uniqueness result in a model where the identity of the proposer follows a general Markov
process, assuming tent–shaped utility functions and the unanimity acceptance rule.
In general, a one–dimensional game of bargaining can have many stationary subgame
perfect equilibria, examples of multiplicity given in Cho and Duggan [5] and Kalandrakis
[12]. In particular, the 7–player game in Kalandrakis [12] has a continuum of pure strategy
stationary subgame perfect equilibria. As is demonstrated in Cho and Duggan [5], station-
ary equilibria are nested in the sense that the social acceptance set in one equilibrium forms
the subset of the social acceptance set of the other equilibrium. Moreover, Kalandrakis
[12] shows that pure strategy stationary subgame perfect equilibria are locally unique and
ﬁnite in number for almost all discount factors.
Asymptotic uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in the one–dimensional
bargaining game has been shown in Cardona and Ponsati [4]. In this paper not only do
we show that equilibria are asymptotically unique, but we also provide a description of the
limit by means of a characteristic equation. A characterization of the limit of equilibria
is also given in Herings and Predtetchinski [11], but this result applies only to a game
with the unanimity acceptance rule and the tent–shaped utility functions. In the case of
time–invariant recognition probabilities the characterization of Herings and Predtetchinski
[11] follows as a corollary from our main result.
Imai and Salonen [9] introduce the concept of representative Nash bargaining solu-
tion for the situation of two–sided bargaining. In a two–sided bargaining problem the
alternatives are represented by points in the interval and the players are divided into two
groups with diametrically opposite preferences. The authors provide an axiomatization of
the representative Nash bargaining solution and the non–cooperative characterization of
it as a limit of stationary equilibrium in a game of bargaining when the probability of the
breakdown of negotiations vanishes. Unlike Imai and Salonen (2000), we allow for players
to have intermediate preferences.
Compte and Jehiel [6] study the performance of majority rules in bargaining assuming
that the proposals at any round of negotiations are drawn by nature randomly from a ﬁxed
distribution over the set of alternatives, so the players have no inﬂuence on the proposals.
They demonstrate that the set of accepted proposals shrinks to a point as the players
become inﬁnitely patient, and provide a characterization of the limit proposal. When the
set of alternatives is one–dimensional they show that the limit proposal is determined by
the bliss points of only two players (called by the authors the “decisive” players). For the
bargaining with unanimous consent, the decisive players are the players with the lowest
and the highest ideal points. Furthermore, the limit proposal coincides with the Nash
bargaining solution of the game where only the two decisive players are present. Both
Compte and Jehiel [6] and Banks and Duggan [1] also ﬁnd that under the simple majority
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rule the limit of stationary equilibria coincides with the ideal point of the median player.
Numerous contributions study stationary subgame perfect equilibria in games of multi-
lateral bargaining where the players have to agree upon a division of an amount of money
among themselves, in which case the alternatives are represented by points in the simplex.
Thus Merlo and Wilson [15, 16] give suﬃcient conditions for the uniqueness of stationary
subgame perfect equilibria (in pure strategies) in a model where the identity of the pro-
poser and the amount of money to be divided follow a Markov process and the unanimous
approval is needed for a proposal to pass. Eraslan [7] establishes uniqueness of stationary
subgame perfect equilibria (in mixed strategies) in a game with a tree similar to the one
described above and the quota acceptance rule. Eraslan and Merlo [8] characterize sta-
tionary subgame perfect equilibria (in mixed strategies) in a model where the amount of
money to be divided is stochastic and a general agreement rule is used.
The study of the asymptotic behavior of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in Hart
and Mas–Colell [10], Miyakawa [17], Laruelle and Valenciano [14], and Britz et al [3]
provides a non–cooperative foundation for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. It is
shown that the limit of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in the n–player game as the
probability of the breakdown of negotiations goes to zero converges to the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution, with the weights given by players’ recognition probabilities. Compte
and Jehiel [6] obtain a similar result in a model where the proposals are randomly drawn
by nature rather than being chosen by the players. Kultti and Vartiainen [13] obtain the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as a limit of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable
set as the discount factor vanishes. The stable set is deﬁned with respect to a dominance
relation where an alternative x dominates an alternative y if some player prefers x even
with a one–period delay.
In contrast, we show that the limit of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in the one–
dimensional bargaining model is generally not equal to the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. The reason for this apparent discrepancy in the results is that the papers that give
a non–cooperative foundation for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution do so under
the assumption that the set of feasible utilities has a smooth and non–level boundary.
This assumption is typically satisﬁed in the divide–the–dollar game, for instance, but it is
incompatible with the model where the set of alternatives is one–dimensional unless there
are only two players.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the game of bargaining and
the concept of bargaining equilibrium. In Section 3 we establish that, along any sequence
of bargaining equilibria, as the discount factor converges to one, the social acceptance set
collapses to a point. Any such point is called a limit of bargaining equilibria. Section 4
presents the main results of the paper: the uniqueness of the limit of bargaining equilibria
and its characterization as a zero of the characteristic function. The proof of the main
results can be found in the Appendix.
In Section 5 we study the comparative statics of the limit of bargaining equilibria with
respect to the acceptance rule. In Section 6 we discuss to extensions of the model: we show
how to explicitly introduce the disagreement payoﬀs and how to extend the results of the
paper to a setup with asymmetric discount factors.
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2 Bargaining equilibria
The unit interval [0, 1] represents the set of alternatives or social states the players must
choose from. Let N be a ﬁnite set of players and let μ be a probability distribution on N .
The probability μ(i) is a recognition probability of player i, that is the probability for player
i to become a proposer. The utility of the alternative x ∈ [0, 1] to player i ∈ N is denoted
by ui(x). We shall assume that the utility functions satisfy the following assumption.
(A1) For each i ∈ N the utility function ui : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is concave, continuous, and it
attains its unique maximum at point x¯i.
The symbol C denotes a collection of subsets of N representing an acceptance rule.
The sets in C are decisive coalitions in the sense that an approval of a proposal by any of
these coalitions is suﬃcient for a passing of a proposal. For instance, if the passing of a
proposal requires the approval of it by each player, then the collection C consists of the
set N alone. If the acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of it by at least q voters,
then the the collection C consists of all sets C ⊂ N such that |C| ≥ q. An interesting
acceptance rule is an adaptation of the rule used by the United Nations Security Council.
The Council consists of ﬁve permanent and ten temporary members, and the passing of its
resolutions requires the yes–votes of at least nine members. Furthermore, each permanent
member has a veto right, which means that the no–vote by any of the permanent members
overrules any majority. Letting P denote the set of permanent members, the collection C
consists of all sets C ⊂ N such that P ⊂ C and |C| ≥ 9. We shall assume the following.
(A2) The collection C is non–empty and monotone: If C ⊂ T ⊂ N and C ∈ C , then
T ∈ C . Furthermore, for each C1 and C2 in C the inequality μ(C1 ∩ C2) > 0 holds.
The condition that any pair of decisive coalitions have a non–empty intersection is known
as properness. Properness is clearly a necessary condition for (A2) which requires that the
intersection of any pair of decisive coalitions contain a player with a positive probability of
recognition. Assumption (A2) is trivially satisﬁed in the case of the unanimity acceptance
rule, i.e. when C = {N}. If the number of players is odd and the collection C represents
the simple majority rule, then assumption (A2) implies that all players’ recognition prob-
abilities are positive, because for each i ∈ N there exist two decisive coalitions C1 and C2
such that C1 ∩ C2 = {i}. If C represents the acceptance rule of the Security Council as
described above, for the assumption (A2) to be satisﬁed it is suﬃcient that at least one
permanent member has a positive recognition probability.
Let δ denote the discount factor. Throughout the paper we assume that 0 ≤ δ < 1.
Given δ, consider the game Γ(δ) deﬁned below. Notice that the game tree of Γ(δ) is exactly
the same as in Cho and Duggan [5] and Banks and Duggan [1].
The game starts in period zero. Each period t begins with nature randomly choosing a
player from the set N to make a proposal. Player i is chosen by nature with the probability
of μ(i). The chosen player proposes an alternative x from [0, 1]. All players (including the
proposer) respond simultaneously to the proposal. Each responder can either accept or
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reject the current proposal. If all players in some decisive coalition C ∈ C accept the
proposal, the game terminates and the proposal is implemented. Otherwise, period t + 1
begins.
If alternative x is agreed upon in period t, player i receives a payoﬀ of δtui(x). The
payoﬀ of perpetual disagreement to any player is zero.
We shall restrict our attention to stationary strategies by which we mean the strategies
such that (a) a proposal of any player is independent of the history of play and (b) the
reaction of a player to a proposal only depends on the proposal itself. Thus a stationary
strategy of player i consists of a proposal xi and an acceptance set Ai. Player i proposes
the point xi whenever player i becomes a proposer and he accepts a proposal x if and only
if x is an element of the set Ai. Suppose now each player uses a stationary strategy. A
joint stationary strategy σ = (x•, A•) induces the acceptance set AC of the coalition C and
the social acceptance set A as follows:
AC =
⋂
i∈C
Ai and A =
⋃
C∈C
AC .
A proposal x is implemented if and only if it is an element of the social acceptance set A.
A joint stationary strategy σ is a no–delay strategy if xi ∈ A for each player i. If such a
strategy is being played, the ﬁrst proposal to be made is implemented, so the game ends
in period t = 0. Thus the expected utility to player i at the beginning of the game on the
no–delay stationary strategy σ is given by
yi =
∑
k∈N
μ(k)ui(xk).
Deﬁnition 1 A joint stationary strategy σ = (x•, A•) is a bargaining equilibrium of the
game Γ(δ) if it is a no–delay strategy and for each i ∈ N we have
xi = argmaxx∈A ui(x) and
Ai = {x ∈ [0, 1]|ui(x) ≥ δyi}.
Each bargaining equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γ(δ). Con-
versely, given a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ(δ) in stationary strategies satisfying an
additional condition of weak dominance, there is a bargaining equilibrium having the same
equilibrium proposals and inducing the same expected payoﬀs (see Banks and Duggan [1]
and Cho and Duggan [5]).
Existence of bargaining equilibrium under the maintained assumptions follows from
Theorems 1 and 2 in Banks and Duggan [1]. In general, there may be many bargaining
equilibria, an example being given in Cho and Duggan [5]. Kalandrakis [12] gives an
example of the game with a one–dimensional set of alternatives having a continuum of
bargaining equilibria.
Suﬃcient conditions for the uniqueness of bargaining equilibrium are given in Cho
and Duggan [5], Cardona and Ponsat´ı [4], Herings and Predtetchinski [11]. Thus Cho and
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Duggan [5] show that bargaining equilibrium is unique for each δ < 1 under the assumption
that the utility functions ui are quadratic and the acceptance rule C is proper and strong.
The acceptance rule C is said to be strong if for each C ⊂ N either C ∈ C or N \C ∈ C .
While any acceptance rule satisfying Assumption (A2) is necessarily proper, it does not
have to be strong.
Cardona and Ponsat´ı [4] show that bargaining equilibrium is unique if recognition is
deterministic, the players’ utility functions are symmetric around the peak, and the quota
acceptance rule is applied. Herings and Predtetchinski [11] establish the uniqueness of
bargaining equilibria in a game with a Markov recognition process, assuming tent–shaped
utility functions and the unanimity acceptance rule.
This contribution establishes instead the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilib-
ria. That is, we show that along any sequence of bargaining equilibria, as the discount
factor goes to one, the social acceptance set converges to a limit which is uniquely deter-
mined by the primitives of the model.
3 The social acceptance set
This section establishes a number of preliminary results, some of which are known. We state
them for the sake of completeness, as a preparation for the results of the following section.
The main result of the section states that along any convergent sequence of bargaining
equilibria of the game Γ(δ), as δ approaches one, the social acceptance set converges to a
singleton set. We show by means of an example that Assumption (A2) plays a crucial role
for this result.
Since we assume the utility functions to be concave and continuous, each individual
acceptance set in a bargaining equilibrium is a closed interval. We write [x−i , x
+
i ] to denote
the individual acceptance set Ai of player i. The acceptance set of coalition C is also a
closed interval denoted by [x−C , x
+
C ], where
x−C = max
i∈C
{x−i } and x
+
C = min
i∈C
{x+i }.
We write E(x•) to denote the expected proposal, that is
E(x•) =
∑
i∈N
μ(i)xi.
Lemma 1 below is essentially Lemma 1 from Banks and Duggan [1]. To their result we
add that the social acceptance set contains at least to distinct points.
Lemma 1 Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) inducing the social
acceptance set A and let a = E(x•) denote the expected equilibrium proposal. Then A is a
closed interval and
[δa, 1− δ + δa] ⊂
⋂
i∈N
Ai ⊂ A.
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x−
x+
x¯i
xi
Figure 1: Equilibrium proposals.
Proof. Take any point p in [0, 1]. Using Jensen’s inequality and the fact that ui(p) ≥ 0
we obtain the following chain of inequalities:
ui((1− δ)p + δa) ≥ (1− δ)ui(p) + δui(a) ≥ δ
∑
k∈N
μ(k)ui(xk) = δyi.
This shows that the point (1− δ)p + δa is an element of the individual acceptance set Ai
of each player i. Since p is an arbitrary point of [0, 1] we conclude that the entire interval
[δa, 1 − δ + δa] is contained in Ai for each i ∈ N . This establishes the ﬁrst inclusion.
The second inclusion follows by the deﬁnition of the social acceptance set and because C
contains the coalition N . Moreover, each point (1−δ)p+δa is an element of the acceptance
set AC of each coalition C. Hence the social acceptance set is a closed interval, being a
union of ﬁnitely many closed intervals AC having a point in common.
We let the social acceptance set be [x−, x+], where
x− = min
C∈C
{x−C} and x+ = max
C∈C
{x+C},
or equivalently
x− = min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{x−i } and x+ = max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{x+i }. (3.1)
The equilibrium proposal xi of player i is a point of [x−, x+] closest to x¯i, the ideal
point of individual i, thus
xi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x− if x¯i ≤ x−
x¯i if x− ≤ x¯i ≤ x+
x+ if x+ ≤ x¯i.
Figure 1 illustrates.
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Deﬁnition 2 Given a collection C of decisive coalitions, deﬁne the numbers α = α(C )
and β = β(C ) as follows:
α = max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{x¯i} and β = min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{x¯i}.
Lemma 2 α ≤ β.
Proof. For let C1 ∈ C and C2 ∈ C be such that α = min{x¯i : i ∈ C1} and β = max{x¯i :
i ∈ C2}. Then by Assumption (A2) there is a player i ∈ C1 ∩ C2. Hence α ≤ x¯i ≤ β.
It is not diﬃcult to see that the interval [α, β] is exactly the core of the voting game as
deﬁned in Banks and Duggan [1]. As an example, consider a quota acceptance rule with
the quota q. The collection C then consists of all coalitions C ⊂ N with |C| ≥ q. Let
N = {1, . . . , m} and suppose that x¯1 ≤ · · · ≤ x¯m. Then α = x¯m−q+1 and β = x¯q.
Lemma 3 Let A = [x−, x+] be the social acceptance set induced by a bargaining equilibrium
of the game Γ(δ). Then x− ≤ β and α ≤ x+.
Proof. As before, let [x−i , x
+
i ] be the individual acceptance set of player i. The point
x¯i is the maximum of the function ui on the set [0, 1], and so is an element of Ai. Thus
x−i ≤ x¯i ≤ x
+
i for each i ∈ N . Using Equations (3.1) we obtain
x− = min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{x−i } ≤ min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{x¯i} = β,
x+ = max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{x+i } ≥ max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{x¯i} = α.
Deﬁne
S = {i ∈ N |μ(i) > 0} and ν = min
i∈S
{μ(i)}.
Since A is a closed interval in [0, 1] and the utility function ui is continuous, the set ui(A) is
also a closed interval. We now show that the length of ui(A) in any bargaining equilibrium
of the game Γ(δ) is bounded above by (1 − δ)/ν for at least one player i ∈ S. We write
len(I) for the length of an interval I, the diﬀerence of its upper and lower endpoints. Notice
that assumption (A2) plays a crucial role in the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) inducing the social
acceptance set A. Then len(ui(A)) ≤ (1− δ)/ν for some i ∈ S.
Proof. Let A = [x−, x+]. There exist coalitions C
− and C+ in C such that x− ∈ AC− and
x+ ∈ AC+ . Now, by assumption (A2) there exists a player i ∈ C
− ∩ C+ with μ(i) > 0.
Thus, both points x− and x+ belong to the individual acceptance set Ai of player i. Since
Ai is an interval, it contains the entire social acceptance set A. Fix one such player i.
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We can estimate the utility of player i on the social acceptance set A as follows. Since
A ⊂ Ai, the utility of player i on the set A is bounded below by δyi. On the other hand,
the proposal xi maximizes player i’s utility on the set A. Thus
ui(A) ⊂ [δyi, ui(xi)].
We derive an upper bound on ui(xi), as follows. The equilibrium proposal xk of each
player k is in the social acceptance set A, and consequently in the individual acceptance
set Ai. Therefore, ui(xk) ≥ δyi for each k. Thus,
yi =
∑
k∈S
μ(k)ui(xk)
≥ μ(i)ui(xi) + (1− μ(i))δyi
= δyi + μ(i)(ui(xi)− δyi)
≥ δyi + ν(ui(xi)− δyi)
= νui(xi) + (1− ν)δyi.
Rearranging yields the inequality
ui(xi) ≤ (1− δ + νδ)yi/ν.
Therefore,
len(ui(A)) ≤ ui(xi)− δyi ≤ (1− δ + νδ)yi/ν − δyi = (1− δ)yi/ν ≤ (1− δ)/ν,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that yi ≤ 1.
We are now in a position to prove the main result of this section: Along any convergent
sequence of bargaining equilibria, as the discount factor converges to one, the social accep-
tance set collapses to a point. Theorem 1 can be obtained by combining Theorems 3 and
5 in Banks Duggan [1]. Instead we give a direct proof of the result, with the advantage of
being able to exploit the special structure of one–dimensional bargaining.
Theorem 1 Let An = [xn
−
, xn+] be the social acceptance set induced by some bargaining
equilibrium of the game Γ(δn). If δn −→ 1, xn
−
−→ a− and x
n
+ −→ a+, then a− = a+.
Proof. Since xn
−
≤ xn+ for each n, in the limit a− ≤ a+. Let A = [a−, a+]. Since
len(ui(I)) is continuous as a function of of the endpoints of the interval I, we have
len(ui(A
n)) −→ len(ui(A)). On the other hand, because the set S is ﬁnite, the preceding
lemma implies that there exists a player i in S such that len(ui(A
n)) ≤ (1 − δn)/ν for
each n. Hence len(ui(A
n)) −→ 0. We conclude that len(ui(A)) = 0, which means that
the function ui is constant on the interval A. But under Assumption (A1) the function
ui is non–constant on any non–degenerate interval. It follows that A is a singleton set.
Therefore, a− = a+, as desired.
Theorem 1 justiﬁes the following deﬁnition.
10
Deﬁnition 3 Let [xn
−
, xn+] be the social acceptance set induced by some bargaining equilib-
rium of the game Γ(δn). Suppose that the sequence δn converges to one and the sequences
xn
−
and xn+ converge to x. Then the alternative x is called a limit of bargaining equilibria.
Theorem 2 below which establishes that each limit of bargaining equilibria is an element
of [α, β] can be deduced by combining Theorems 3 and 5 in Banks and Duggan [1] and by
noticing that [α, β] is the core of the voting game. In our one–dimensional setting, however,
the result follows at once from Lemma 3. The median voter result of Corollary 1 is likewise
due to Banks and Duggan [1] (see the discussion following Theorem 5). The result states
that if the passing of a proposal requires an approval of it by the simple majority of the
voters, then the limit of bargaining equilibria is the ideal point of the median player, i.e.
that individual who divides the set of players into two coalitions of equal size, those with
lower ideal points and those with higher ideal points.
Theorem 2 Each limit of bargaining equilibria lies in the interval [α, β].
Proof. Let x be a limit of bargaining equilibria. Thus there exists a sequence δn con-
verging to 1 and for each n a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δn) with the social
acceptance set [xn
−
, xn+] such that the sequences x
n
−
and xn+ converge to the point x. By
the preceding lemma, xn
−
≤ β and α ≤ xn+ for each n. Taking the limit, we obtain the
inequalities x ≤ β and α ≤ x.
Corollary 1 Suppose N = {1, . . . , 2m + 1} and x¯1 ≤ x¯2 ≤ · · · ≤ x¯2m ≤ x¯2m+1. Suppose
the collection C consists of all coalitions C ⊂ N with |C| ≥ m + 1. Then the point x¯m+1
is the unique limit of of bargaining equilibria.
Proof. The result follows once we notice that α = x¯m+1 = β.
We have thus shown that along a converging sequence of bargaining equilibria the social
acceptance set collapses to a point. In the following section we establish that this point,
called the limit of bargaining equilibria, is in fact independent of the choice of the sequence
of equilibria, and is uniquely determined by the primitives of the model.
We conclude this section with two examples that highlight the role of Assumptions
(A1) and (A2) for the results of the paper. We ﬁrst show that Theorem 1 need not be
true if assumption (A2) is violated. Suppose there are three players l, m and r, and
the yes–votes of any two players are suﬃcient for a passing of a proposal. Assume that
μ(l) = μ(r) = 1/2 so that only players l and r ever make proposals. Assumption (A2)
is violated because both {l,m} and {m, r} are decisive coalitions, but their intersection
consists of player m alone who has zero recognition probability.
Suppose that the utility function of player l is ul(x) = 1−x, that of player r is ur(x) = x
and that of player m is um(x) = 1−|x−1/2|. The utility functions are illustrated in Figure
2. Assumption (A1) is clearly satisﬁed.
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Figure 2: The utility functions in the example of Section 3.
Now, for each δ ∈ [0, 1) there exists a bargaining equilibrium where [0, 1] is the social
acceptance set. In this equilibrium player l proposes the point 0 and player r proposes the
point 1. The expected utility is 1/2 for all players. The individual acceptance set of player
l is Al = [0, 1− (δ/2)], the individual acceptance set of player r is Ar = [δ/2, 1] and that of
player m is [0, 1]. The acceptance set of the coalition {l,m} equals [0, 1− (δ/2)], while the
acceptance set of coalition {m, r} equals [δ/2, 1]. The union of [0, 1− (δ/2)] and [δ/2, 1] is
clearly the entire set [0, 1].
Assumption (A1) requires the utility functions to be single–peaked and concave. We
now show by means of the following example that uniqueness of the limit of bargaining
equilibria breaks down if we drop the assumption of concavity of the utility functions.
Suppose there are three players, 0, 1, and 2, with the utility functions u0(x) = e
−x,
u1(x) = e
x−1 and u2(x) = (6 − e
1−x)/5. The function u0 is decreasing while u1 and u2
are increasing. Hence all three functions are strictly quasi–concave and single–peaked, but
only u2 is concave.
Suppose player 0 makes a proposal with the probability of 1/2 while players 1 and 2
with the probability of 1/4 each. Assume the unanimity rule.
Let sδ = ln(2 − δ) − ln(δ). Fix a point x ∈]0, 1[ and let δx = 2/(1 + e
1−x). The
interval [x, x + sδ] is the social acceptance set in a bargaining equilibrium of the game
Γ(δ) whenever δ > δx. In equilibrium, player 0 proposes the point x while the players 1
and 2 propose the point x + sδ. To see that this is indeed an equilibrium observe that
player 0 is exactly indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the point x+ sδ, player 1 is
exactly indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the point x, while player 2 is (weakly)
better oﬀ accepting x. That is u0(x + sδ) = δy0 and u1(x) = δy1 and u2(x) ≥ δy2 where
yi = [ui(x) + ui(x+ sδ)]/2. Thus the individual acceptance sets for the players 0 and 1 are
A0 = [0, x + sδ] and A1 = [x, 1], respectively, while player 2’s acceptance set is a subset of
A1.
As δ converges to 1 the set [x, x + sδ] converges to the singleton set {x}. Hence each
point of ]0, 1[ is a limit of bargaining equilibria.
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4 The characteristic function
We have so far shown that along a convergent sequence of bargaining equilibria as the dis-
count factor approaches one, the social acceptance set collapses to a point. Any such point
is called a limit of bargaining equilibria. In this section we deﬁne the characteristic function
and show that its unique generalized zero point is an element of the social acceptance set
of each bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) for each δ ∈ [0, 1[. As a consequence, the
generalized zero of the characteristic function is the unique limit of bargaining equilibria.
The formulae of this section make use of the the left and right derivatives of the utility
functions. We do not want to impose the diﬀerentiability of the utility functions by as-
sumption because this would rule out the utilities that depend on the absolute distance of
the alternative from the bliss point (as in Figure 2), which appears to be a natural choice
for the utility functions.
Remark 1 Each function ui has left and right derivatives at each point x ∈]0, 1[ denoted
by li(x) and ri(x). The function ui is diﬀerentiable at the point x ∈]0, 1[ if and only if
ri(x) = li(x). Both li and ri are non–increasing functions on ]0, 1[ and ri(x) ≤ li(x). The
interval [ri(x), li(x)] is the subgradient of ui at point x. Given a ∈]0, 1[ and x ∈ [0, 1], the
inequality ui(x) − ui(a) ≤ s(x − a) holds for each s ∈ [ri(a), li(a)]. Since x¯i is the unique
maximum of ui on [0, 1] we have 0 < ri(x) ≤ li(x) whenever x < x¯i, ri(x¯i) ≤ 0 ≤ li(x¯i),
and ri(x) ≤ li(x) < 0 whenever x¯i < x.
For each alternative x deﬁne
μ−(x) = μ({i ∈ N |x¯i ≤ x}) and μ+(x) = μ({i ∈ N |x < x¯i}). (4.1)
Thus μ−(x) is the total recognition probability of the players whose ideal point lies in
the interval [0, x], while μ+(x) is the complementary probability. The function μ− is the
cumulative distribution function of the players’ bliss points induced by the recognition
probabilities. For each x ∈]0, 1[ we deﬁne
ξ−(x) = max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{ri(x)/ui(x)} and ξ+(x) = min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{li(x)/ui(x)}, (4.2)
ξ(x) = μ−(x)ξ−(x) + μ+(x)ξ+(x). (4.3)
The expressions is (4.2) are well deﬁned, since each function ui is positive on ]0, 1[. The
function ξ is referred to as a characteristic function. It will be convenient to extend the
characteristic function to all of the interval [0, 1] by letting ξ(0) = +∞ and ξ(1) = −∞.
Lemma 5 The characteristic function ξ is a decreasing function on [0, 1]. We have
ξ−(x) ≤ ξ+(x) for each x ∈]0, 1[.
Proof. Take an x ∈]0, 1[. Let C− and C+ in C be such that
ξ−(x) = min
k∈C
−
{rk(x)/uk(x)} and ξ+(x) = max
k∈C+
{lk(x)/uk(x)},
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By Assumption (A2) the coalitions C− and C+ have a non–empty intersection. For each
i ∈ C− ∩ C+ we have
ξ−(x) ≤ ri(x)/ui(x) ≤ li(x)/ui(x) ≤ ξ+(x).
Now lk(x)/uk(x) and rk(x)/uk(x) are the left and the right derivatives, respectively, of
the strictly concave function lnuk and hence are decreasing as functions of x on the open
interval ]0, 1[. It follows that both ξ+ and ξ− are decreasing functions on ]0, 1[. To see that
the function ξ is a decreasing function rewrite (4.3) as
ξ(x) =
∑
μ(i)ξi(x), where ξi(x) =
{
ξ+(x) if x < x¯i
ξ−(x) if x¯i ≤ x.
It is ξi is a decreasing function for each i. The result follows.
The most important result of the paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let A = [x−, x+] be the social acceptance set induced by a bargaining equilib-
rium of the game Γ(δ). Then ξ(x−) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x+).
The proof of Theorem 3 relegated to the Appendix.
Deﬁnition 4 The point x ∈ [a, b] is a generalized zero of the function f : [a, b] → R ∪
{−∞,+∞} if there are sequences {xn
−
} and {xn+} of points in [a, b] converging to x such
that lim f(xn
−
) ≤ 0 ≤ lim f(xn+). The point x ∈ [a, b] is a generalized ﬁxed point of the
function g : [a, b] → [a, b] if it is a generalized zero of the function f : [a, b] → R given by
f(x) = g(x)− x.
The limits of the sequences f(xn
−
) and f(xn+) in the above deﬁnition are understood to be
the limits in the extended real line and are allowed to be inﬁnite.
It is clear that any point x ∈ [a, b] such that f(x) = 0 is a generalized zero of the
function f (take xn
−
= x and xn+ = x). Conversely, if x is a generalized zero of f and f
is continuous at x, then f(x) = 0. A decreasing function f has at most one generalized
zero. A decreasing function f such that f(a) ≥ 0 ≥ f(b) has exactly one generalized zero.
Moreover, the point p is a generalized zero of such a function f if and only if f(x) > 0 for
each x in [a, b] with x < p and f(x) < 0 for each x in [a, b] with p < x.
The inequalities of Theorem 3 can be restated as x− ≤ p ≤ x+ where p denotes the
generalized zero of the function ξ.
Theorem 4 The limit of bargaining equilibria is unique and is equal to the (unique) gen-
eralized zero of the function ξ.
Proof. Let x be a limit of bargaining equilibria. By Deﬁnition 3, there exist sequences xn
−
,
xn+ and δ
n such that [xn
−
, xn+] is the social acceptance set in a bargaining equilibrium of the
game Γ(δn), the sequence δn converges to 1 and both xn
−
and xn+ converge to x. We have
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ξ(xn
−
) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(xn+) for every n by Theorem 3. Hence lim ξ(x
n
−
) ≥ 0 ≥ lim ξ(xn+). Thus the
point x is a generalized zero of the function ξ.
The following result follows easily from the preceding theorems.
Theorem 5 Let x be the limit of bargaining equilibria. Let 0 ≤ δ < 1 and let A be the
social acceptance set in a bargaining equilibrium of Γ(δ). Then x is an element of A.
We now discuss an alternative deﬁnition for the characteristic function and provide
some intuition behind our results. Recall that by Theorem 2 each limit of bargaining
equilibria lies in the interval [α, β]. In particular, if α coincides with β, as under the simple
majority voting rule for example, then α = β is the unique of limit bargaining equilibria.
Thus suppose α < β and for each point x ∈]α, β[ deﬁne
ϕ−(x) = min
C∈C
max
i∈C
x<x¯i
{
−
ui(x)
li(x)
}
and ϕ+(x) = max
C∈C
min
i∈C
x¯i<x
{
−
ui(x)
ri(x)
}
. (4.4)
Notice that the expressions in (4.4) involve no division by zero since li(x) > 0 whenever
x < x¯i and ri(x) < 0 whenever x¯i < x. Furthermore, the maxima and the minima are
always taken over non–empty sets: since α < x < β each coalition C ∈ C contains some
player i with x < x¯i and some player k with x¯k < x. Notice that ϕ−(x) < 0 < ϕ−(x) for
each x ∈]α, β[. Deﬁne
ϕ(x) = μ−(x)ϕ−(x) + μ+(x)ϕ+(x) (4.5)
for each α < x < β. We extend ϕ it to all of the interval [0, 1] by letting ϕ(x) = +∞ for
x ≤ α and ϕ(x) = −∞ for β ≤ x.
All our results could be restated in terms of the function ϕ. Indeed, the function ϕ is
decreasing on the interval [α, β] and its generalized zero equals that of the function ξ. To
see this notice that for each x ∈]α, β[ we have
ϕ−(x) = −1/ξ+(x) and ϕ+(x) = −1/ξ−(x).
Hence, for each x ∈ [0, 1] we have ξ(x) < 0 if and only if ϕ(x) < 0 and ξ(x) > 0 if and only
if ϕ(x) > 0. Thus both Theorems 3 and 4 continue to be true if ξ is replaced by ϕ.
What is the intuition behind these deﬁnitions? Let us make the following mental ex-
ercise: Take a bargaining equilibrium with the expected equilibrium proposal a = E(x•)
and consider replacing the utility function of player i in the deﬁnition of bargaining equi-
librium by its ﬁrst–order approximation ui(x) ≈ ui(a) + u
′
i(a)(x − a) around the point
a. The expected utility to player i can then be approximated as yi ≈ ui(a). Recall now
that player i accepts the proposal x if and only if ui(x) ≥ δyi, the condition that can be
approximated as u′i(a)(x − a) ≥ −(1 − δ)ui(a). Hence we ﬁnd that the left endpoint (if
u′i(a) > 0) or the right endpoint (if u
′
i(a) < 0) of the individual acceptance set Ai of player
i is approximately given by a− (1− δ)ui(a)/u
′
i(a).
Now suppose that no ideal point falls inside the social acceptance set. Thus for each
player i either x¯i < x− or x+ < x¯i. Using Equations (3.1) we approximate the endpoints
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Figure 3: The utility functions (4.6), where x¯l = 0, x¯m = 1/2, and x¯r = 1 (The horizontal
axis extends from 0 to 1, the vertical axis from 0.5 to 1).
of the social acceptance set. It is easy to see that when taking the maximum of x−i over
the players i in some coalition C we can disregard the players with x¯i < x−. Similarly,
when taking the minimum of x+i over i ∈ C we can disregard the players with x+ < x¯i.
This yields the approximations x− ≈ a + (1 − δ)ϕ−(a) and x+ ≈ a + (1 − δ)ϕ+(a). Or
equivalently,
x− − a
1− δ
≈ ϕ−(a) and
x+ − a
1− δ
≈ ϕ+(a).
Thus ϕ−(a) and ϕ+(a) can be interpreted as the he coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst–order Taylor
expansion of the endpoints of the social acceptance set. The diﬀerence ϕ+(a) − ϕ−(a) is
the speed of convergence of the length x+ − x− of the social acceptance set to zero.
Since no ideal point falls inside the social acceptance set, the point x− is proposed with
a probability of μ−(a) and the point x+ with the probability of μ+(a) so that the expected
proposal is a = μ−(a)x− + μ+(a)x+. Substituting the ﬁrst–order approximations for x−
and x+ we arrive at the condition that ϕ(a) be approximately zero.
We conclude this section with a number of special cases and examples. Consider the
utility functions given by the equation
ui(x) = exp(−(x− x¯i)
2/2). (4.6)
Figure 3 depicts the utility functions (4.6) with the peaks at 0, 1/2 and 1. We have
u′i(x) = ui(x)(x¯i − x) and u
′′
i (x) = −ui(x)[1− (x¯i − x)
2]. Since both x and x¯i are in [0, 1]
we have (x¯i−x)
2 ≤ 1 and therefore u′′i (x) ≤ 0. Thus the functions ui are concave on [0, 1].
We have the following result.
Corollary 2 Suppose the utility functions are given by Equation (4.6). Then the limit
of bargaining equilibria is a generalized ﬁxed point of the function f given by f(x) =
β − (β − α)μ−(x).
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Proof. Since the utility functions are diﬀerentiable, the left and the right derivatives at
each point coincide with the derivative denoted by u′i(x). Now u
′
i(x)/ui(x) = −x + x¯i. It
follows that
ξ−(x) = max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{−x + x¯i} = −x + max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{x¯i} = −x + α
ξ+(x) = min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{−x + x¯i} = −x + min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{x¯i} = −x + β.
Therefore
ξ(x) = −x + αμ−(x) + βμ+(x) = −x + f(x).
The result follows.
We now illustrate by means of an example that the limit of bargaining equilibria
does not in general coincide with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Deﬁne the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as a maximizer of the asymmetric Nash product
ρ(x) = ×ui(x)
μi on [0, 1], where the product is taken over the players i ∈ N with μ(i) > 0.
For the utility functions given by Equation (4.6) the logarithm of the asymmetric Nash
product is given by ln ρ(x) =
∑
μ(i)(x− x¯i)
2/2. Clearly the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution is the average ideal point
∑
μ(i)x¯i.
Now suppose there are three players with equal recognition probabilities whose ideal
points are 0, p and 1. Suppose the approval of all three players is needed for the passing
of a proposal. Then α = 0, β = 1 and so the limit of bargaining equilibria is the gener-
alized ﬁxed point of the function μ+. Hence the limit of bargaining equilibria equals the
generalized ﬁxed point of the function μ+, which one can easily see to be⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1/3 if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/3,
p if 1/3 ≤ p ≤ 2/3,
2/3 if 2/3 ≤ p ≤ 1.
On the other hand the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is equal to (p + 1)/3 and is
not equal to the limit of bargaining equilibria unless p = 1/2.
Two of our results below are motivated by the setup of the model in Herings and
Predtetchinski [11], where the players are assumed to have tent–shaped utility functions
ui(x) = 1 − |x − x¯i|. In addition Herings and Predtetchinski [11] assume that there is
a player with a peak at point 0 and a player with a peak at 1, and consider only the
unanimity acceptance rule. The focus of [11] is somewhat diﬀerent from ours: the authors
concentrate on the analysis of a class of Markov recognition rules. For the case of time–
invariant recognition the authors show (see Proposition 7.4) that the limit of bargaining
equilibrium equals the generalized ﬁxed point of the function μ+.
Using Theorem 4 we extend this result in two ways: In the next section we derive the
bargaining equilibria under the tent–shaped utility functions for the general acceptance
rule and the distribution of bliss points. Below we retain the unanimity acceptance rule
but, rather than assuming that all players have a tent–shaped utility function, we require
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that there be two players, called a and b, having linear utility functions ua(x) = 1− x and
ub(x) = x.
Corollary 3 Suppose C = {N}. Suppose ua(x) = 1 − x for some player a ∈ N and
ub(x) = x for some player b ∈ N . Then the limit of bargaining equilibria equals the
generalized ﬁxed point of the function μ+.
Proof. Let 0 < x < 1. Using the fact that the functions ui are concave and non–negative
we obtain the inequalities
−ui(x) ≤ ui(0)− ui(x) ≤ li(x)(0− x)
−ui(x) ≤ ui(1)− ui(x) ≤ ri(x)(1− x).
Rearranging these yields
−1/(1− x) ≤ ri(x)/ui(x) ≤ li(x)/ui(x) ≤ 1/x.
It follows that
ξ−(x) = min
i∈N
{ri(x)/ui(x)} = u
′
a(x)/ua(x) = −1/(1− x)
ξ+(x) = max
i∈N
{li(x)/ui(x)} = u
′
b(x)/ub(x) = 1/x.
The value of the function ξ at x is therefore given by
ξ(x) = −
μ−(x)
1− x
+
μ+(x)
x
=
μ+(x)− x
x(1− x)
.
Let f(x) = μ+(x) − x. For each x ∈ [0, 1] we have ξ(x) ≥ 0 if and only if f(x) ≥ 0
and ξ(x) ≤ 0 if and only if f(x) ≤ 0. Therefore if the point p is a generalized zero of the
function ξ it is also a generalized zero of the function f and hence a generalized ﬁxed point
of the function μ+.
5 Some implications
In this section we consider the families of utility functions satisfying the following assump-
tion.
(A3) There exists a concave decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable function h : [0, 1]→
[0, 1] such that ui(x) = h(|x− x¯i|) for each i ∈ N .
We refer to the functions satisfying this assumption as symmetric because the utility func-
tion of player i can be obtained from that of player k by shifting it horizontally by x¯i− x¯k.
Moreover, each player’s utility function is symmetric around its peak.
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Notice that the utility functions satisfying condition (A3) necessarily satisfy condition
(A1). One interesting family of utility functions satisfying (A3) are the tent–shaped
utilities given by
ui(x) = 1− |x− x¯i|, (5.1)
in which case the function h is given by h(x) = 1− x. The utility functions given by (4.6)
is another useful special case of (A3) (in this case h(x) = exp(−x2/2)).
A symmetric family of utility functions oﬀers a natural setup for the study of compar-
ative statics of the limit of bargaining equilibria with respect to the acceptance rule. The
reason for this is the way the acceptance rule C enters the characteristic equation: as is
clear from the formulae below the function ξ only depends on the collection C through the
variables α(C ) and β(C ). These variables therefore summarize all relevant aspects of the
acceptance rule.
Lemma 6 Suppose the assumption (A3) holds. Let 0 < x < 1 and v(x) = h′(x)/h(x).
We have
ξ(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−μ−(x)v(α− x)− μ+(x)v(β − x) if x < α
+μ−(x)v(x− α)− μ+(x)v(β − x) if α ≤ x ≤ β
+μ−(x)v(x− α) + μ+(x)v(x− β) if β < x
(5.2)
Proof. Deﬁne the functions f− and f+ by the following equations:
f−(x) =
{
−v(−x) if x < 0
v(x) if 0 ≤ x,
f+(x) =
{
−v(−x) if x ≤ 0
v(x) if 0 < x.
Then
ri(x)/ui(x) = f−(x− x¯i) and li(x)/ui(x) = f+(x− x¯i).
The function v is decreasing, because it is the derivative of the logarithm of the function
h, and it is everywhere non–positive, because h is decreasing. It follows that the functions
f− and f+ are decreasing. Hence, the expressions f−(x− x¯i) and f+(x− x¯i) are increasing
in x¯i for each x. Therefore
ξ−(x) = max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{f−(x− x¯i)} = f−(x−max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{x¯i}) = f−(x− α)
ξ+(x) = min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{f+(x− x¯i)} = f+(x−min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{x¯i}) = f+(x− β).
Hence
ξ(x) = μ−(x)f−(x− α) + μ+(x)f+(x− β). (5.3)
The result follows.
As is clear from these expressions, the limit of bargaining equilibria under Assump-
tion (A3) depends on the acceptance rule C only through the variables α(C ) and β(C ).
Corollary 4 below shows it is a non–decreasing function of both.
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Corollary 4 Suppose Assumption (A3) is satisﬁed. Then the limit of bargaining equilibria
is non–decreasing as a function of α and non–decreasing as a function of β.
Proof. Consider Equation (5.3). Since both functions f− and f+ are decreasing, ξ(x)
is non–decreasing in α and non–decreasing in β for each ﬁxed x ∈]0, 1[. The result now
follows since ξ(x) is decreasing in x.
Using Lemma 6 we derive the limit of bargaining equilibria for the tent–shaped utility
functions.
Corollary 5 Suppose the utility functions are given by Equation (5.1). Then the limit of
bargaining equilibria is equal to α if
1
2 + α− β
≤ μ−(α),
it is equal to β if
μ−(β) ≤
1 + α− β
2 + α− β
,
and it is equal to the generalized ﬁxed point of the function g : [α, β] → [α, β] given by
g(x) = 1 + α− μ−(x)(2 + α− β) if
μ−(α) ≤
1
2 + α− β
and
1 + α− β
2 + α− β
≤ μ−(β).
Proof. We have h(a) = 1− a and v(a) = −1/[1− a]. For each x ∈]α, β[ we have
ξ(x) =
−x + 1 + α− μ−(x)[2 + α− β]
(1− x + α)(1 + x− β)
.
In the ﬁrst case one can easily see that ξ(x) < 0 for each α < x < β. Since by Theorem 2
the limit of bargaining equilibria lies in the interval [α, β], it must be equal to α. Similarly,
in the second case ξ(x) > 0 for each α < x < β, so that β is the generalized zero of ξ. Fi-
nally, consider the third case. Let the function f : [α, β]→ R be given by f(x) = g(x)−x.
It is easy to see that for each point x ∈]α, β[ we have f(x) > 0 if and only if ξ(x) > 0
and f(x) < 0 if and only if ξ(x) < 0. Therefore if the point p ∈ [α, β] is a generalized
ﬁxed point of the function g, and hence a generalized zero of the function f , it is also a
generalized zero of the function ξ.
We now turn to the comparative statics of the limit of bargaining equilibria with respect
to the acceptance rule. First we argue that, if the recognition probabilities are uniform
and the utility functions are symmetric, the outcome of bargaining under the unanimity
acceptance rule is in some sense less extreme than that under the simple majority rule.
Consider ﬁrst an example where there are m+1 players with the utility functions u0(x) =
1 − x and m players with the utility functions u1(x) = x. Each player has a recognition
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probability of 1/(2m + 1). Since the point 0 is the ideal point of the median voter, 0 is
the limit of bargaining equilibria under the simple majority rule. On the other hand, the
limit of bargaining equilibria under the unanimity acceptance rule is m/(2m+1). Thus no
matter how many players there are, the simple majority rule selects the extreme left of the
interval [0, 1], while the unanimity acceptance rule leads to a more intermediate outcome.
This feature of the example can be generalized as follows.
Let a and b denote the extreme left and the extreme right ideal points, respectively,
that is
a = min
i∈N
{x¯i} and b = max
i∈N
{x¯i}.
Whatever the acceptance rule, the limit of bargaining equilibria always lies between these
extreme points. Claim 1 establishes that the point selected by the unanimity acceptance
rule is closer to the middle of the interval [a, b] than the point selected by the simple
majority rule.
Claim 1 Suppose Assumption (A3) is satisﬁed. Suppose |N | = 2m+1 and μ(i) = 1/(2m+
1) for each i ∈ N . Let xs and xu denote the limit of bargaining equilibria under the simple
majority rule and the unanimity acceptance rule, respectively. Let c = (a+ b)/2. If xs ≤ c
then xs ≤ xu ≤ c and if c ≤ xs then c ≤ xu ≤ xs.
Proof. Let ξ be the characteristic function under the unanimity acceptance rule. The
expression for ξ is given by Lemma 6, with α = a and β = b. Recall that the point xu is
a generalized zero of the function ξ. To prove the claim it is suﬃcient to show that (A) if
x < xs and x < c then ξ(x) ≥ 0, and (B) if x > xs and x > c then ξ(x) ≤ 0. It is easy to
see that facts (A) and (B) indeed imply the claim.
Recall that if we label the players so that x¯1 ≤ · · · ≤ x¯2m+1 then x
s = x¯m+1 (see
Corollary 1). Because the recognition probabilities are assumed to be uniform, we have
1/2 ≤ μ−(x
s) and μ−(x) ≤ 1/2 whenever x < x
s.
To prove fact (A) take an x in [0, 1] such that x < xs and x < c. If x < a then ξ(x) ≥ 0
as can be seen directly from (5.2) because the function v is everywhere non–positive.
Suppose a ≤ x. Since x < c < b, we have
ξ(x) = μ−(x)v(x− a)− μ+(x)v(b− x) ≥ [v(x− a)− v(b− x)]/2 ≥ 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality holds because μ−(x) ≤ 1/2 and μ+(x) ≥ 1/2 for x < x
s. To see
that the second inequality is true we notice that since x < c we have x− a ≤ b− x. Since
v is a decreasing function we have v(x− a) ≥ v(b− x). This proves fact (A). The proof of
fact (B) is similar.
Claim 1 implies that the unanimity acceptance rule is superior to the simple majority
rule according to the Rawlsian welfare criterion. Indeed, under (A3) the worst–oﬀ player
is the player whose bliss point is most distant from the implemented alternative. Clearly,
the most distant bliss point is either the point a or the point b. The closer the alternative
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Figure 4: The limit of bargaining equilibria under diﬀerent quota rules.
The limit of bargaining equilibrium is given by the diagonal if q = 3, the dashed line if q = 4
and the thick line if q = 5.
to the midpoint c of the interval [a, b] the higher the utility of the worst–oﬀ player. Hence
the maximization of the utility of the worst–oﬀ player dictates a choice of xu over xs.
The quota rules can be more or less extreme than the unanimity rule depending on the
distribution of the bliss points. Consider an example with ﬁve players, where the utility
functions are given by Equation (4.6) and the recognition probability is 1/5 for each player.
Suppose one player has the ideal point 0, two players the ideal point p and two players the
ideal point 1. Consider a quota acceptance rule that requires the approval of a proposal
by at least q players. Since the point p is the ideal point the median player, it is the limit
of bargaining equilibria if q = 3. If q = 4 the limit of bargaining equilibria is given by
(2 + 3p)/5 and if q = 5 it is given by⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2/5 if p ≤ 2/5
p if 2/5 ≤ p ≤ 4/5
4/5 if 4/5 ≤ p.
Figure 4 depicts the limit of bargaining equilibria as a function of p for each quota. In
particular, if p = 1/2, the limit of bargaining equilibria is 1/2 if q = 3 or q = 5, but is
7/10 if q = 4. If p = 1/6, the limit of bargaining equilibria is 1/6 if q = 3, 1/2 if q = 4 and
2/5 if q = 5. This example also shows that the limit of bargaining equilibria need not be
a monotone function of the quota q.
Now consider altering the acceptance rule by removing or adding a decisive coalition.
Let C and C ′ be two acceptance rules and let x(C ) and x(C ′) be the corresponding limits
of bargaining equilibria. We shall write minC and maxC to denote the minimum and the
maximum of the ideal points x¯k of the players k in the coalition C.
Claim 2 Let the collection C ′ be obtained from C by adding the coalition T and all its
supersets, that is C ′ = C ∪ {C : T ⊂ C ⊂ N}. Suppose both C and C ′ satisfy Assumption
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(A2). Then x(C ′) ≤ x(C ) if either (a) x¯i ≤ x(C ) for each i ∈ T or if (b) the utility
functions satisfy Assumption (A3) and x¯k ≤ α(C ) for some player k ∈ T .
Proof. It is easy to see that α(C ′) = max{α(C ),minT} and β(C ′) = min{β(C ),maxT}.
Under assumption (a) it holds that maxT ≤ x(C ) and hence β(C ′) ≤ x(C ). Moreover,
x(C ′) ≤ β(C ′) by Theorem 2. Under assumption (b) we have min T ≤ α(C ) so that
α(C ) = α(C ′). Since β(C ′) ≤ β(C ) the result follows from Corollary 4.
A coalition T ∈ C is said to be minimal if there is no C ∈ C with C ⊂ T and C 
= T .
Claim 3 shows that removing a minimal decisive coalition not containing player i never
makes player i worse oﬀ.
Claim 3 Suppose the utility functions satisfy Assumption (A3). Let T ∈ C be a minimal
decisive coalition let C ′ = C \ {T}. Suppose the collections C and C ′ satisfy Assumption
(A2). Then |x(C ′)− x¯i| ≤ |x(C )− x¯i| for each i ∈ N \ T .
Proof. Since C ′ ⊂ C we have α(C ′) ≤ α(C ) and β(C ) ≤ β(C ′). Fix a player i ∈ N \ T .
Since T is an element of the collection C and since C is a monotone collection, the coalition
{i}∪T is also an element of C . Therefore {i}∪T is an element of C ′, implying the following:
x¯i ≤ maxT ⇒ max({i} ∪ T ) = maxT ⇒ β(C ) = β(C
′)
x¯i ≥ minT ⇒ min({i} ∪ T ) = minT ⇒ α(C ) = α(C
′)
x¯i ≤ minT ⇒ min({i} ∪ T ) = x¯i ⇒ x¯i ≤ α(C
′)
x¯i ≥ maxT ⇒ max({i} ∪ T ) = x¯i ⇒ β(C
′) ≤ x¯i.
Thus if minT ≤ x¯i ≤ maxT , then x(C ) = x(C
′) because α(C ) = α(C ′) and β(C ) = β(C ′).
If x¯i ≤ minT then α(C
′) ≤ α(C ) and β(C ) = β(C ′) so x(C ′) ≤ x(C ) by Corollary 4.
Furthermore, x¯i ≤ α(C
′) ≤ x(C ′) ≤ x(C ). Finally, if maxT ≤ x¯i, then α(C
′) = α(C ) and
β(C ) ≤ β(C ′) so x(C ) ≤ x(C ′) by Corollary 4. Furthermore x(C ) ≤ x(C ′) ≤ β(C ′) ≤ x¯i.
The result follows.
Turning to the comparative statics with respect to the recognition probabilities, we ﬁnd
that increasing the recognition probability of player i at the expense of some other player
cannot make player i worse oﬀ. To see this, starting from the initial probability distribution
μ consider increasing the recognition probability of player i and decreasing that of player
j, while keeping the rest of the distribution unchanged. Suppose without loss of generality
that x¯i ≤ x¯j . It is clear that the cumulative distribution function μ− does not change
outside the interval [x¯i, x¯j ] and that it increases within the interval. Consequently, the
characteristic function ξ is unchanged outside the interval [x¯i, x¯j] and it decreases within
the interval. Therefore, if the limit of bargaining equilibria corresponding to the original
recognition probabilities is outside the interval [x¯i, x¯j], it is unchanged, while if it is within
the interval, it shifts to the left, i.e. towards the ideal point of player i.
In the extreme case player i is the only player entitled to make proposals (μ(i) = 1).
Under the unanimity acceptance rule the limit of bargaining equilibria will coincide with
player i’s ideal point irrespectively of preferences of the other players.
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We conclude this section with the observation that risk–aversion is disadvantageous
in bargaining. To see this consider the diﬀerentiable utility functions u¯i and ui satisfy-
ing Assumption (A1) and suppose u¯i is more risk–averse than ui. Then there is a con-
cave non–negative diﬀerentiable function f such that u¯i(x) = f(ui(x)) for each x. Then
|u¯′i(x)/u¯i(x)| ≤ |u
′
i(x)/ui(x)| for each x. Using this fact it is easy to show that replacing
the function ui by u¯i results in a shift of the limit of bargaining equilibria away from the
ideal point of player i.
6 Extensions
6.1 Introducing the disagreement payoﬀs
Implicitly assumed in the model of Section 2 is that the disagreement payoﬀ, i.e. the
payoﬀ received by the players in the absence of agreement, is zero. Since we have assumed
that the alternatives in [0, 1] give the individuals non–negative utility, everyone weakly
prefers all the alternatives in [0, 1] to the disagreement payoﬀ. As detailed below, the
latter assumption can be weakened: it suﬃces to require that there be some alternative in
[0, 1] which is strictly preferred by everyone to the disagreement payoﬀ.
As in Banks and Duggan [1] and Cho and Duggan [5] we can introduce the disagreement
payoﬀs explicitly into the model by redeﬁning the payoﬀ of the game Γ(δ) as follows: If the
alternative x is agreed upon in period t deﬁne the payoﬀ to player i as (1− δt)di + δ
tui(x),
where the ﬁrst term is the discounted sum of the disagreement payoﬀs di over the periods
0, . . . , t − 1, and the second term is the discounted sum of the payoﬀs ui(x) as of period
t (the sums are normalized by the factor of 1− δ). In the case of perpetual disagreement
deﬁne the payoﬀ to be di. It is not diﬃcult to see that bargaining equilibria can be deﬁned
and analyzed as before with the function ui replaced everywhere by the function vi given
by vi(x) = ui(x)− di.
To be consistent with the rest of the paper we continue to maintain the normalization
di = 0 for each i ∈ N . We replace Assumption (A1) by the following, weaker, assumption:
(A4) For each i ∈ N the utility function ui : [0, 1] → R is concave, continuous, and it
attains its unique maximum at point x¯i. Moreover, there exists a point p ∈ [0, 1]
such that ui(p) > 0 for each i ∈ N .
The version of Lemma 1 which applies under Assumption (A4) is the following.
Lemma 7 Assume (A2) and (A4). Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game
Γ(δ). The acceptance set AC of each coalition C and the social acceptance set induced by
the bargaining equilibrium are non–empty closed non–degenerate intervals.
One proves Lemma 7 by showing that each player’s individual acceptance set contains the
point (1− δ)p+ δE(x•) whenever the point p ∈ [0, 1] is such that ui(p) > 0 for each i ∈ N .
In Lemma 4 the upper bound on the length of ui(A) should be replaced by (1 − δ)b/ν
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where the constant b has to be chosen to be larger than ui(x) for each i ∈ N and each
x ∈ [0, 1]. Other results of Section 3 continue to be true exactly as they are stated.
When α < β we deﬁne the function ϕ by Equations (4.4) and (4.5). For completeness,
in the case α = β deﬁne ϕ as ϕ(x) = +∞ if 0 ≤ x < α, ϕ(α) = 0, and ϕ(x) = −∞ if
α < x ≤ 1.
Lemma 8 The function ϕ is a decreasing function on [α, β].
Proof. We ﬁrst show that ϕ− is a decreasing function. Let α < a < b < β. Write

i(x) = −ui(x)/li(x). We have for each coalition C ∈ C
max{
i(a) | i ∈ C, a < x¯i} ≥ max{
i(a) | i ∈ C, b < x¯i}
> max{
i(b) | i ∈ C, b < x¯i}
≥ ϕ−(b).
The ﬁrst inequality of the chain is true since the set {i ∈ C : a < x¯i} contains the set
{i ∈ C : b < x¯i}. The second inequality is true because for each player i with b < x¯i we
have ui(a) < ui(b) and li(a) ≥ li(b) > 0 implying that 
i(a) > 
i(b). The third inequality
is true by the deﬁnition of ϕ−. Since the above inequalities are true for each C ∈ C it
follows that ϕ−(a) > ϕ−(b). Similarly one proves that ϕ+ is a decreasing function.
To prove that ϕ is a decreasing function we rewrite (4.5) as
ϕ(x) =
∑
μ(i)ϕi(x), where ϕi(x) =
{
ϕ+(x) if x < x¯i
ϕ−(x) if x¯i ≤ x.
Since ϕ−(x) < 0 < ϕ+(x) for each x it follows that ϕi is a decreasing function for every i.
It follows that ϕ is a decreasing function.
The main results can then be restated as Theorems 6 below. The sketch of the proof
of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix B. Theorem 6 implies that the limit of bargaining
equilibria is a generalized zero of the function ϕ.
Theorem 6 Assume (A2) and (A4). Let A = [x−, x+] be the social acceptance set induced
by a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ). Then ϕ(x−) ≥ 0 ≥ ϕ(x+).
6.2 Asymmetric discount factors
Throughout the paper we have made the assumption that the players have a common
discount factor. Consider instead a model where the player i’s discount factor is given as
a function δi = fi(δ) of the parameter δ. The functions fi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] are assumed to
meet the following condition.
(A5) We have 0 ≤ fi(δ) < 1 if 0 ≤ δ < 1 and fi(1) = 1. Furthermore, the function fi is
continuously diﬀerentiable at the point 1 and f ′i(1) > 0.
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The version of Lemma 1 which applies in the model with asymmetric discount factors
is the following.
Lemma 9 Assume (A1), (A2) and (A5). Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the
game Γ(δ) inducing the social acceptance set A. Let a = E(x•) and σ = max{δi}. Then A
is a closed interval containing the interval [σa, 1− σ + σa].
Proof. Take any point p in [0, 1]. Using Jensen’s inequality and the fact that ui(p) ≥ 0
we obtain the following chain of inequalities:
ui((1− σ)p + σa) ≥ (1− σ)ui(p) + σui(a) ≥ σ
∑
k∈N
μ(k)ui(xk) = σyi ≥ δiyi.
Hence the point (1−σ)p+σa is an element of the individual acceptance set of each player,
and hence also of the social acceptance set. Taking p = 0 and p = 1 we see that both
the point σa and 1−σ+σa are contained in the social acceptance set. The result follows.
In Lemma 4 the upper bound on the length of ui(A) should be replaced by (1− δi)/ν.
Other results of Section 3 continue to be true exactly as stated. Letting γi = f
′
i(1) we
deﬁne the characteristic function ξ by Equations (4.1), (4.3) and the following equation
which replaces (4.2):
ξ−(x) = max
C∈C
min
i∈C
{ri(x)/γiui(x)} and ξ+(x) = min
C∈C
max
i∈C
{li(x)/γiui(x)}. (6.1)
The main result is as follows.
Theorem 7 Assume (A1), (A2) and (A5). The limit of bargaining equilibria is unique
and is equal to the (unique) generalized zero of the function ξ.
If the players’ discount factors are diﬀerent, it is no longer true that the generalized
zero of the function ξ is an element of the social acceptance set in each equilibrium of the
game Γ(δ). In other words, the inequalities ξ(x−) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x+) are not generally true in our
extended setting with asymmetric discount factors. Nevertheless, the proof of Theorem 7
follows the same strategy as the proof of Theorem 4: we establish a lower bound on ξ(x−)
and an upper bound on ξ(x+) and show that both bounds converge to zero as δ goes to
one. The sketch of the proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix C.
One special case of (A5) warrants a special attention. Consider the functions fi given
by the equation
fi(δ) = δ/(γi(1− δ) + δ), where γi > 0. (6.2)
In this case Lemmata 10–13 of Appendix A that make up the proof of Theorem 3 continue to
be true exactly as they are stated for the modiﬁed characteristic function. Hence Theorem
3 also holds under Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A5). Thus in the case of (6.2) our results
carry over to the model with asymmetric discount factors almost eﬀortlessly.
The two extensions we discussed in Subsections 6.1 and 6.2 cannot be easily combined.
If players have diﬀerent discount factors, and at the some of the alternatives give negative
utilities, then the social acceptance set need not be an interval.
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A The proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 10 Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) inducing the social
acceptance set A = [x−, x+]. If 0 < x− < 1, then
−(1− δ) ≤ +δ[x+ − E(x•)]ξ−(x−), (A.1)
+(1− δ) ≤ −δ[x− − E(x•)]ξ+(x−). (A.2)
Proof. To prove the ﬁrst inequality we have to show that there exists a coalition C ∈ C
such that for each player i in C the inequality
−(1− δ) ≤ δ[x+ − E(x•)]ri(x−)/ui(x−) (A.3)
holds. Let C+ ∈ C be such that x+ ∈ AC+ . We show that the inequality (A.3) holds for
each player of the coalition C+.
Let i be a player of the coalition C+. For each k ∈ N we have the inequalities
ui(x+)− ui(xk) ≤ ri(xk)[x+ − xk] ≤ ri(x−)[x+ − xk],
where the ﬁrst inequality is a deﬁning inequality for the subgradient of the function ui,
and the second inequality follows from the fact that the right derivative is a non–increasing
function, so that ri(xk) ≤ ri(x−) for each k ∈ N , and the fact that xk ≤ x+. (The right
derivative at the point xk exists if xk < x+, because in that case xk is in ]0, 1[. If xk = x+,
then the extreme left and right hand sides of the above inequality are both zero.) Taking
the expected value with respect to k in both sides of the above inequality yields
ui(x+)− yi ≤ ri(x−)[x+ − E(x•)].
The inequality (A.3) is trivially satisﬁed for any player i with x− < x¯i, because in
this case 0 < ri(x−). Assume that x¯i ≤ x−. Then the function ui is non–increasing on
the interval [x−, x+], in particular ui(x+) ≤ ui(x−). Since the coalition C+ unanimously
approves of the alternative x+, we have δyi ≤ ui(x+) for each i ∈ C+. We have then the
following inequalities:
0 ≤ ui(x+)− δyi =
= (1− δ)ui(x+) + δ[ui(x+)− yi] ≤
≤ (1− δ)ui(x+) + δri(x−)[x+ −E(x•)] ≤
≤ (1− δ)ui(x−) + δri(x−)[x+ −E(x•)].
Rearranging yields (A.3).
To prove the second inequality we must show that for every coalition C ∈ C there
exists a player i in C satisfying the inequality
1− δ ≤ −δ[x− − E(x•)]li(x−)/ui(x−). (A.4)
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Thus let C be an arbitrary coalition from C . First we argue that there exists a player
i ∈ C such that ui(x−) ≤ δyi. Suppose not. Then δyi < ui(x−) for each i ∈ C. Since
under the assumption of the lemma x− > 0 there exists a small enough  > 0 such that
δyi < ui(x− − ) for each i ∈ C. But then the point x− −  is an element of the social
acceptance set A, contradicting the fact that x− is the left endpoint of A.
Take any player i ∈ C such that ui(x−) ≤ δyi. For each k ∈ N we have the inequality
ui(xk)− ui(x−) ≤ li(x−)[xk − x−].
Taking the expected values on both sides with respect to k yields
yi − ui(x−) ≤ li(x−)[E(x•)− x−].
Therefore,
0 ≥ ui(x−)− δyi =
= (1− δ)ui(x−) + δ[ui(x−)− yi] ≥
≥ (1− δ)ui(x−) + δli(x−)[x− − E(x•)].
Rearranging yields (A.4). This completes the proof.
Lemma 11 Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) inducing the social
acceptance set A = [x−, x+]. Then the following inequalities hold:
x+ −E(x•) ≥ +μ−(x−)[x+ − x−], (A.5)
x− −E(x•) ≥ −μ+(x−)[x+ − x−]. (A.6)
Proof. Let bi be equal to x− whenever x¯i ≤ x− and x+ otherwise. It is clear from Figure
1 that xi ≤ bi for each i ∈ N . It follows that
E(x•) ≤ E(b•) = μ−(x−)x− + μ+(x−)x+.
Therefore,
x+ − E(x•) ≥ x+ − [μ−(x−)x− + μ+(x−)x+] = μ−(x−)[x+ − x−],
x− − E(x•) ≥ x− − [μ−(x−)x− + μ+(x−)x+] = −μ+(x−)[x+ − x−].
The result follows.
We are now in a position to prove one of the inequalities of Theorem 3.
Lemma 12 Let A = [x−, x+] be the social acceptance set induced by a bargaining equilib-
rium of the game Γ(δ). Then ξ(x−) ≥ 0.
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Proof. Since the interval A is non–degenerate by Lemma 1, we know that 0 ≤ x− < 1. If
x− = 0, there is nothing to prove because ξ(0) = +∞ by the deﬁnition of ξ.
Suppose 0 < x− < 1. Inequality (A.2) of Lemma 10 implies that 0 ≤ ξ+(x−). Therefore,
if 0 ≤ ξ−(x−), we immediately obtain the desired inequality 0 ≤ ξ(x−).
It remains to analyze the case where x− is the interior point of [0, 1] and the inequalities
ξ−(x−) ≤ 0 ≤ ξ+(x−) hold. We combine each of the two inequalities of Lemma 10 with
those of Lemma 11, as follows:
−(1− δ) ≤ δ[x+ − E(x•)]ξ−(x−) ≤ δμ−(x−)[x+ − x−]ξ−(x−), (A.7)
+(1− δ) ≤ −δ[x− − E(x•)]ξ+(x−) ≤ δμ+(x−)[x+ − x−]ξ+(x−). (A.8)
The ﬁrst inequality in (A.7) is inequality (A.1) of Lemma 10. The second inequality in
(A.7) is obtained using (A.5). The ﬁrst inequality in (A.8) is inequality (A.2) of Lemma
10, and the second inequality in (A.8) is obtained using (A.6). Finally, adding up (A.7)
and (A.8) and dividing by δ[x+ − x−] yields the result.
We complete the proof of Theorem 3 by establishing the second inequality of the theorem
using a kind of a symmetry argument.
Lemma 13 Let A = [x−, x+] be the social acceptance set induced by a bargaining equilib-
rium of the game Γ(δ). Then 0 ≥ ξ(x+).
Proof. Given a point x of [0, 1], let x˙ = 1 − x. Consider the game Γ˙(δ) which has
the same set N of players, the same recognition probabilities μ, the same set C of decisive
coalitions as the game Γ(δ), and the utility function u˙i(x) = ui(x˙) for player i. Thus Γ˙(δ) is
essentially the same game as Γ(δ) with the alternatives permuted so that the alternative x
is mapped into x˙. It is clear that the game Γ˙(δ) has a bargaining equilibrium that induces
the social acceptance set [x˙+, x˙−]. Let ξ˙ denote the characteristic function of the game
Γ˙(δ). Since x˙+ is a lower endpoint of the social acceptance set in a bargaining equilibrium
of Γ˙(δ), Lemma 12 applies to show that ξ˙(x˙+) ≥ 0. We complete the proof by showing
that ξ˙(x) ≤ −ξ(x˙) for each x. For then ξ(x+) ≤ −ξ˙(x˙+) ≤ 0, as desired.
If x = 0 or x = 1, the result follows from the deﬁnition of the characteristic function.
So take an x ∈]0, 1[ and let x˙ = 1− x. Let l˙i, r˙i, ξ˙−, ξ˙+, μ˙−, and μ˙+ be deﬁned as before
for the game Γ˙(δ). Then
l˙i(x) = −ri(x˙) and r˙i(x) = −li(x˙),
ξ˙−(x) = −ξ+(x˙) and ξ˙+(x) = −ξ−(x˙).
Let μo(x) = μ({i ∈ N |x¯i = x}). Since the utility function u˙i attains its maximum at the
point 1− x¯i, we have
μ˙−(x) = μ({i ∈ N |1− x¯i ≤ x}) = μ+(x˙) + μo(x˙),
μ˙+(x) = μ({i ∈ N |x < 1− x¯i}) = μ−(x˙)− μo(x˙).
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We can now express the characteristic function ξ˙ as follows:
ξ˙(x) = −ξ(x˙) + μo(x˙)[ξ−(x˙)− ξ+(x˙)].
By Lemma 5, ξ−(x˙) ≤ ξ+(x˙). We conclude that ξ˙(x) ≤ −ξ(x˙), as desired.
B The proof of Theorem 6
If α = β, then Theorem 6 is merely a restatement of Theorem 2. Hence throughout this
section we assume α < β.
Lemma 14 Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) inducing the social
acceptance set A = [x−, x+]. If α < β then x− < β and α < x+.
Proof. We prove a stronger statement: If β > 0 then x− < β, and if α < 1 then α < x+.
This clearly implies the result.
Take a player i ∈ N . For each k ∈ N we have δui(xk) ≤ δui(x¯i) < ui(x¯i), where the
ﬁrst inequality holds since x¯i is the maximum of the function ui on [0, 1], and the second
inequality holds since ui(x¯i) > 0 by Assumption (A4). Taking the expectation with respect
to k we obtain δyi < ui(x¯i).
It follows that if x¯i > 0 then there exists an  > 0 small enough such that δyi < ui(x¯i−),
so that the point x¯i −  is an element of the individual acceptance set of player i. Thus
x−i < x¯i whenever x¯i > 0.
Now suppose that β > 0. Then each decisive coalition C ∈ C has a player i ∈ C with
x¯i > 0, in which case x
−
i < x¯i as shown above. It follows that max{x
−
i : i ∈ C} < max{x¯i :
i ∈ C} for each C ∈ C . Taking the minimum over C ∈ C on both sides of the inequality
we obtain x− < β. The proof that α < x+ if α < 1 is similar.
Lemma 15 Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) inducing the social
acceptance set A = [x−, x+]. If α < x− < β, then
(1− δ)ϕ+(x−) ≥ δ[x+ −E(x•)]. (B.1)
(1− δ)ϕ−(x−) ≥ δ[x− −E(x•)]. (B.2)
Proof. To prove the ﬁrst inequality we show that there exists a coalition C ∈ C such that
for each player i ∈ C with x¯i < x− for whom the inequality
−(1− δ)ui(x−)/ri(x−) ≥ δ[x+ −E(x•)] (B.3)
holds. This is done exactly as in the proof of Lemma 10.
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To prove the second inequality we must show that for every coalition C ∈ C there
exists a player i ∈ C with x− < x¯i satisfying the inequality
−(1− δ)ui(x−)/li(x−) ≥ δ[x− −E(x•)]. (B.4)
First one shows, exactly as in the proof of Lemma 10 that there exists a player i ∈ C
such that ui(x−) ≤ δyi. Take any player i ∈ C such that ui(x−) ≤ δyi. We now argue that
x− < x¯i. For suppose on the contrary that x¯i ≤ x−. Then the function ui is decreasing on
the interval [x−, x+]. Therefore for each point x with x− < x ≤ x+ we have ui(x) < ui(x−)
and so ui(x) < δyi. This shows that the individual acceptance set Ai of player has at most
one point, namely x−, in common with the social acceptance set A. That is Ai∩A ⊂ {x−}.
Consider now the acceptance set of the coalition C. By deﬁnition AC is a subset of both
Ai and A. Hence AC ⊂ {x−}, which contradicts the fact that AC is a non–empty non–
degenerate interval (Lemma 7).
Take a player i ∈ C with such that ui(x−) ≤ δyi. One shows, exactly as in the proof of
Lemma 10, that player i satisﬁes the inequality (B.4).
Lemma 16 Let A = [x−, x+] be the social acceptance set induced by a bargaining equilib-
rium of the game Γ(δ). Then ϕ(x−) ≥ 0.
Proof. As before we assume α < β. Hence x− < β by Lemma 14. Moreover, if x− ≤ α
then ϕ(x−) = +∞ by the deﬁnition of ϕ. It remains to consider the case α < x− < β. We
combine each of the two inequalities of Lemma 15 with those of Lemma 11, as follows:
(1− δ)ϕ+(x−) ≥ δ[x+ − E(x•)] ≥ +δμ−(x−)[x+ − x−] (B.5)
(1− δ)ϕ−(x−) ≥ δ[x− − E(x•)] ≥ −δμ+(x−)[x+ − x−] (B.6)
Multiplying (B.5) by μ+(x−) and (B.6) by μ−(x−) and adding up yields ϕ(x−) ≥ 0.
The proof completes with Lemma 13 which needs no adjustments (except that ξ is
replaced everywhere by ϕ).
C The proof of Theorem 7
We prove Theorem 7 by establishing a lower bound on ξ(x−) and an upper bound on ξ(x+),
where [x−, x+] is the social acceptance set in a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ),
and then showing that both bounds converge to zero as δ approaches one. To deﬁne the
bounds we need some additional notation. Given δ such that fi(δ) > 0 for each i ∈ N let
g−(δ) = min
i∈N
{
1− fi(δ)
fi(δ)γi
}
and g+(δ) = max
i∈N
{
1− fi(δ)
fi(δ)γi
}
.
f(δ) = max
i∈N
fi(δ)
e(δ) = (g+(δ)− g−(δ))/(1− f(δ)).
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Theorem 8 Suppose Assumptions (A2), (A4) and (A5) are satisﬁed. Suppose fi(δ) > 0
for each i ∈ N . Let A = [x−, x+] be the social acceptance set induced by a bargaining
equilibrium of the game Γ(δ). Then e(δ) ≤ ξ(x−) and ξ(x+) ≤ −e(δ).
Theorem 7 follows from Theorem 8 by noticing that e(δ) converges to 0 as δ goes to
1. To see that this notice that both g−(δ)/(1 − δ) and g+(δ)/(1 − δ) converge to 1 while
[1 − f(δ)]/(1 − δ) converges to min{f ′i(1) : i ∈ N}, which is positive by (A5). Below we
sketch a proof of Theorem 8.
Lemma 17 Suppose fi(δ) > 0 for each i ∈ N . Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of
the game Γ(δ) inducing the social acceptance set A = [x−, x+]. If 0 < x− < 1, then
−g+(δ) ≤ +[x+ − E(x•)]ξ−(x−), (C.1)
+g−(δ) ≤ −[x− − E(x•)]ξ+(x−). (C.2)
Proof. We ﬁrst show, exactly as in the proof of Lemma 10, that there exists a coalition
C ∈ C such that for each player i in C the inequality
−(1− δi) ≤ δi[x+ −E(x•)]ri(x−)/ui(x−)
holds. Dividing by δiγi we obtain
−g+(δ) ≤ −(1− δi)/δiγi ≤ [x+ − E(x•)]ri(x−)/γiui(x−).
This establishes (C.1)
To prove the second inequality we show, exactly as in the proof of Lemma 10, that for
every coalition C ∈ C there exists a player i in C satisfying the inequality
1− δi ≤ −δi[x− −E(x•)]li(x−)/ui(x−).
Dividing by δiγi we obtain
g−(δ) ≤ (1− δi)/δiγi ≤ −δi[x− −E(x•)]li(x−)/ui(x−).
This establishes (C.2)
Lemma 18 Let A = [x−, x+] be the social acceptance set induced by a bargaining equilib-
rium of the game Γ(δ). Then ξ(x−) ≥ −e(δ).
Proof. Since the interval A is non–degenerate by Lemma 1, we know that 0 ≤ x− < 1. If
x− = 0, there is nothing to prove because ξ(0) = +∞ by the deﬁnition of ξ.
Suppose 0 < x− < 1. Inequality (C.2) of Lemma 17 implies that 0 ≤ ξ+(x−). Therefore,
if 0 ≤ ξ−(x−), we have −e(δ) ≤ 0 ≤ ξ(x−). It remains to consider the case when 0 < x− < 1
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and ξ−(x−) ≤ 0 ≤ ξ+(x−). In this case we combine each of the two inequalities of Lemma
17 with those of Lemma 11, as follows:
−g+(δ) ≤ [x+ − E(x•)]ξ−(x−) ≤ μ−(x−)[x+ − x−]ξ−(x−), (C.3)
+g−(δ) ≤ −[x− − E(x•)]ξ+(x−) ≤ μ+(x−)[x+ − x−]ξ+(x−). (C.4)
The ﬁrst inequality in (C.3) is inequality (C.1) of Lemma 17. The second inequality in
(C.3) is obtained using (A.5). The ﬁrst inequality in (C.4) is inequality (C.2) of Lemma 17,
and the second inequality in (C.4) is obtained using (A.6). Now we have the inequalities
ξ(x−) ≥ −
g+(δ)− g−(δ)
x+ − x−
≥ −
g+(δ)− g−(δ)
1− f(δ)
= −e(δ),
where the ﬁrst inequality is obtained by adding up (C.3) and (C.4) and dividing by [x+−x−].
To obtain the second inequality we notice that by Lemma 9 we have 1− f(δ) ≤ x+ − x−.
The result follows.
The proof of Theorem 8 completes with Lemma 13, which requires no adjustments.
References
[1] Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan: A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice.
American Political Science Review 94: 73–88, 2000.
[2] Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher Wolinsky: The Nash Bargaining
Solution in Economic Modelling. The RAND Journal of Economics 17: 176–188, 1986.
[3] Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski:
Non–Cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. Journal
of Economic Theory, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.003.
[4] Daniel Cardona and Clara Ponsat´ı: Bargaining One–Dimensional Social
Choices. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 627–651, 2007.
[5] Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan: Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibria in a One–
Dimensional Model of Bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 113: 118–130, 2003.
[6] Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel: Bargaining over Randomly Gener-
ated Oﬀers: A new perspective on multi–party bargaining. Levine’s Bibliography
122247000000000739, UCLA Department of Economics, 2004.
[7] Hu¨lya Eraslan: Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoﬀs in the Baron–
Ferejohn Model. Journal of Economic Theory 103: 11–30, 2002.
[8] Hu¨lya Eraslan and Antonio Merlo: Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of
Bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 103: 31–48, 2002.
33
[9] Haruo Imai and Hannu Salonen: The Representative Nash Solution for Two–
sided Bargaining Problems. Mathematical Social Sciences 39: 349-365, 2000.
[10] Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell: Bargaining and Value. Econometrica
64: 357–380, 1996.
[11] P. Jean–Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski: One–dimensional
Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities. Journal of Economic Theory 145:
189–215, 2010.
[12] Tasos Kalandrakis: Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of
bargaining games. Economic Theory 28: 309–329, 2006.
[13] Klaus Kultti and Hannu Vartiainen: Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets,
discounting, and Nash bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 137: 721–728, 2007.
[14] Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano: Noncooperative foundations of
bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index. Games and Economic
Behaviour 65, 242–255, 2009.
[15] Antonio Merlo and Charles Wilson: A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bar-
gaining with Complete Information. Econometrica 63: 371-399, 1995.
[16] Antonio Merlo and Charles Wilson: Eﬀcient delays in a stochastic model of
bargaining. Economic Theory 11: 39–55, 1998.
[17] Toshiji Miyakawa: Non–cooperative Foundation of n–Person Asymmetric Nash
Bargaining Solution. Osaka University of Economics, working paper No. 2006–2.
34
